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Climate Geoengineering Governance (CCG) 
Climate Geoengineering Governance (http://geoengineering-governance-
research.org) is a research project which aims to provide a timely basis for the 
governance of geoengineering through robust research on the ethical, legal, 
social and political implications of a range of geoengineering approaches. It is 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AHRC) - grant ES/J007730/1  
 
CGG Working Papers 
The CGG Working Paper series is designed to give a first public airing to a wide 
range of papers broadly related to the project’s themes.  Papers published in this 
series may be, but are not necessarily, early outputs from the project team; 
equally they may be from other authors, and reflect different perspectives and 
different issues from those directly pursued by the project itself.  The aim is to 
promote vigorous and informed debate, in a spirit of pluralism. 
What the working papers have in common is that they will all be at an early 
stage of development, prior to full publication.  Comment and response, at any 
level of detail, is therefore doubly welcome.  Please send all responses in the 
first instance to the authors themselves - each paper contains a correspondence 
address.  We will be looking for opportunities to use the website or other project 
activities to give a wider airing to any dialogues and debates that develop 
around a paper or issue.  
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Geoengineering Governance and the Two Lessons from Science 
and Technology Studies 	  
Geoengineering has gained some attention over the last 5-10 years as a 
potential climate policy option and, not least, research agenda (Royal 
Society 2009; Fleming 2010; Rayner et al. 2013). It has come with 
promises of capabilities to control the climate and to resolve climate 
policy dilemmas (POST 2009; Bickel and Lane 2009), but it has also come 
with warnings of unwanted, even disastrous, effects – on the climate as 
well as on society (ETC 2010; Gardiner 2011; Macnaghten and 
Szerszynski 2013). This situation has raised questions, familiar from other 
areas of science and technology, about our ability to stop, direct or steer 
technology innovation in such a way as to avoid or ameliorate potential 
drawbacks.  
 




Such discussions tend to draw on analyses of other technologies and our 
past experience with them. In the discourse informed by science and 
technology studies (STS), these discussions often refer to the Collingridge 
dilemma (Collingridge 1980; Liebert and Schmidt 2010; Shackley and 
Thompson 2012; also, see Rayner 2010), stating that at early stages of 
technology innovation it is hard to know what the outcomes will be and 
what the outcomes of any interventions in it will be, whereas at later 
stages of the innovation process the technology may have become so 
stabilised, entrenched and ubiquitous that it is hard to change. 
 
Another lesson from STS tends to be forgotten, however. Much of the 
discussion around the future of geoengineering and how to govern it has 
relied on a linear conceptualisation of technical innovation. The linear 
model of technology innovation holds that technology develops through a 
set of stages, denoting distinct kinds of activities, each temporally and 
causally dependent on the completion of previous stages. The model 
typically includes at least a distinction between a research stage and a 
deployment stage, and sometimes with further stages in between, like 
development, testing, demonstration, marketing, etc. (Godin 2006). 
The linear model also implies an identity between what is being 
researched, developed, deployed, etc. across the stages, i.e. that it is the 
same object that recurs in each stage, albeit in different states of 
development or completion. The linear model has been thoroughly 
critiqued in technology and innovation studies since at least the 1970s 
(see, e.g. Godin 2006), for reasons as described below, but is still a 
common trope in both academic and policy discourse on geoengineering. 
For example, the metaphor of a stream is frequently used to evoke this 
identity, when speaking of upstream research and downstream 
deployment.  
 
This paper aims to address the lack of critique of the linear model in 
geoengineering governance discourse, and to illustrate different 
considerations for a geoengineering governance framework that is not 
based on a linear model of technology innovation. Finally, we set to 
explore a particular approach to geoengineering  governance based on 
Peter-Paul Verbeek’s notion of ‘technology accompaniment’. 





The Linear Model in Geoengineering Discourse 	  
As compared to geoengineering research proposals, there is a paucity of 
geoengineering technology development plans, or analyses and 
assessments at all informed by any models of technology innovation. A 
few contributions can be identified, and they tend to be linear in 
character. The NOVIM (2009) report goes some way to set out a plan for 
the development of stratospheric aerosol injection, and is a good example 
of a strongly linear conceptualisation of innovation. 
 
The NOVIM report projects five progressive phases of research, 
development and deployment: (I) non-invasive laboratory and 
computational research; (II) field experiments; (III) monitored 
deployment; (IV) steady-state intervention and (V) disengagement. Each 
phase is seen to offer distinct challenges and objectives with successively 
higher levels of risk (NOVIM 2009, 29). The report presents these phases 
as cumulative, with new phases adding to on-going efforts in previous 
ones, rather than replacing them. Feedback from later phases to earlier 
ones and any need to retreat to earlier phases from later ones are not 
discussed, nor is there any recognition that later phase activities might 
precede earlier ones. 
 
Alongside these phases, an argument is developed about the need for 
better knowledge from science to be used by decision-makers. The report 
also makes a strong distinction between what can and what should be 
done, and defines the latter question being outside of the scope of the 
report (NOVIM 2009, v). This delimitation rests on the assumption that 
non-natural-science concerns are not necessary for designing a valid 
innovation strategy and that scientists can legitimately proceed to 
produce such plans separately from experts on economics, social science, 
ethics, etc. as well as participation from other concerned parties. The 
linear model lends itself well to arguments about the ethical and political 
neutrality of a science happening in isolation from other disciplines, actors 
and interests. 
 




The 2011 geoengineering technology assessment from the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) offers another example of 
distinctly linear conceptualisation of geoengineering. The report sets out 
to assess a range of geoengineering technologies, choosing to focus on 
four dimensions: maturity, effectiveness, “cost factors”, and “potential 
consequences” (2011, 77). Maturity is here rated according to so-called 
technology readiness levels (TRL), with reference to their use by NASA 
and the European Space Agency and their wider circulation as a standard 
tool (2011, 77). The version of the TRL model used encompasses nine 
levels of readiness, ranging from “basic principles observed and reported” 
to “actual system has been proven in successful mission operations” 
(2011, 78-79). These levels are depicted as sequential.1 
 
These two examples are somewhat different in that the NOVIM report sets 
out a plan for future technology innovation, and the GAO seeks to assess 
the status quo. Also, the GAO report is oriented towards the future in that 
the purpose of the assessment is to guide decisions on research funding 
and to direct our exploration of potential geoengineering futures. 
However, in both cases we are presented with ideas about the distance 
from imagined future states as well as some contours of a route towards 
it. A key attraction of the linear model is that it allows us to promote (and 
critique) current science with reference to specific, imagined technological 
futures. 
 
The linear model – or versions thereof – is commonplace in the literature 
on geoengineering. We will not attempt any exhaustive review here, but a 
few examples will go some way towards backing this claim up. McLaren 
(2012) uses TRLs (referencing GAO 2011) to assess the maturity of 
negative emissions technologies. The authors of the Oxford principles 
refer to stages of development in elaborating the principles (Rayner et al. 
2013). So does the Royal Society report (2009), and it even goes so far 
as to offer predictions of when the technologies will have progressed 
through them to maturity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Interestingly,	  the	  GAO	  applies	  the	  model	  only	  to	  the	  artefacts	  needed	  to	  deliver	  the	  intervention	  (e.g.	  mirrors	  and	  the	  means	  to	  place	  them	  into	  space),	  rather	  than	  to	  a	  bigger	  socio-­‐technical	  system	  that	  includes	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  the	  intervention	  is	  to	  have	  effects	  (e.g.	  a	  designed	  atmosphere)	  and	  the	  tools	  we	  use	  to	  analyse	  these	  mechanisms.	  The	  maturity	  of	  climate	  modelling	  and	  our	  ability	  to	  predict	  effects	  and	  side-­‐effects	  are	  not	  assessed	  in	  this	  report.	  





It is worth noting that the linear model not only affects the way we 
conceptualise geoengineering technology innovation; it also affects the 
way that we conceptualise how it should be governed. For instance, it sets 
up a temporal and causal distinction between early and late parts of the 
innovation process. Understood this way, we can formulate a choice 
between intervening early or late (Collingridge 1980), upstream or 
downstream (Corner et al. 2012; Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013; Carr 
et al. 2013), before or after deployment (Rayner et al. 2013). The linear 
model also associates “early” with science and “late” with use, and so the 
model enables the formulation of a choice between choosing to intervene 
early in science or later in use (deployment). Discussions about whether 
to intervene in science have been framed as a decision about how far 
upstream, i.e. how far removed from the use context, intervention should 
be made. 
 
David Collingridge (1980) articulated this as a matter of the early 
uncertainty about the later form and impact of emerging technologies 
versus later certitude, in combination with early freedom of choice and 
malleability, and later locking-in to specific forms and less scope for 
change. Again, early stages are conceived as happening at a distance 
from societal contexts, and – unlike deployment – not embedded in and 
locked-in with societal structures or impacted by interests, or at least 
much less so.2 
 
The linear model can be a discursive tool for both the promotion and 
constraint (as interventions) of geoengineering-related activities. In either 
kind of intervention, it is a matter of attaching scenarios (be they 
promises or threats) of technology futures to current science.3 Moreover, 
the politics of using linear models varies by context, and needs to be 
evaluated in reference to it. However, any use would tend to reproduce to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  To	  be	  fair,	  this	  is	  how	  the	  Collingridge	  dilemma	  is	  often	  presented,	  whereas	  Collingridge	  himself	  transcended	  this	  simple	  model	  of	  early	  stage	  malleability	  as	  the	  unrestricted	  agency	  of	  apolitical	  expert-­‐scientists,	  to	  analytically	  include	  (and	  advocate)	  multiple	  knowledges,	  values,	  and	  diverse	  actors	  (although	  primarily	  policy	  makers,	  rather	  than	  technology	  users)	  throughout	  the	  innovation	  process	  (Liebert	  and	  Schmidt	  2010).	  3	  For	  an	  example	  of	  the	  latter,	  see	  Macnaghten	  and	  Szerszynski	  (2013),	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  ‘social	  constitution’	  of	  geoengineering	  is	  knowable	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  predict	  threats	  pertaining	  to	  solar	  radiation	  management.	  




some degree the privileged position of scientists in making choices about 
research priorities, pertaining to their assumedly early, societally isolated 
domain4 as well as reproducing the faith in science as the predominant 
and ethically and politically neutral mechanism of socio-technical change.  
 
Critiques of the Linear Model in Technology and Innovation 
Studies 	  
As mentioned above, the linear model has been thoroughly critiqued in 
technology and innovation studies. A classic debate framed it in terms of 
a choice between science “push” and demand “pull” as the main 
explanation of technology innovation (Di Stefano et al. 2012; Godin and 
Lane 2013), thus reifying the two stages. This was superseded by models 
allowing for feedbacks between different stages (e.g. Kline 1985) and 
models that abandoned the notion of stages altogether in favour of 
interaction between a set of activities that are not by necessity ordered in 
a sequence. 
 
Substantively, studies have shown that the linear model seriously 
underplays uncertainty and contingency (including scope for 
setbacks/failure as well as otherwise surprising outcomes), in that it 
suggests an ordered progression from research stage to 
later ’completion‘, and, relatedly, that it tends to underplay the scope for 
choice and agency in favour of a pre-determined and predictable 
technology innovation outcome (Rip 1995). A single starting point is 
thought to lead to a single outcome, or at least a very restricted set of 
outcomes. By placing science at the start of the innovation process, and 
assuming that subsequent stages are determined (or strongly shaped) by 
it, the linear model tends to highlight science as the primary locus and 
source of novelty and creativity (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). This 
downplays contributions of actors and knowledges seen as being 
‘downstream’, for example ‘users’ (Fleck 1994) or policy makers (Jasanoff 
2004). The allocation of agency mainly to the realm of science serves to 
simplify the social and political processes involved. Most actors apart from 
scientists can in this way be made to seem external, as part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  We	  believe	  that	  is	  why	  the	  term	  ‘upstream	  engagement’	  is	  inherently	  limiting	  when	  arguing	  for	  the	  democratisation	  of	  science	  and	  technology.	  




context, and with mainly a reactive role to play. Politics can be deferred 
to downstream deployment, located elsewhere and later in relation to the 
upstream science, which has now been purified and made to seem 
untouched by politics (Russell and Williams 2002).  
 
It may be worth commenting briefly on why the linear model persists in 
the face of decades of thorough critique. The use of science in technology 
innovation (Latour 1985; Gibbons et al. 1994) has undoubtedly created a 
demand for ways of thinking about how technology futures are implicated 
in current science. As long as discussions and analyses focus on science, 
the ways in which it is taken up or connected with technology innovation 
can often remain obscure without problem. In fact, linear promises of 
future technology may be most valuable to scientists and their sponsors, 
if left unscrutinised. To develop technologies, it is frequently necessary to 
build up expectations and hype (Brown and Michael 2003; Bergek et al. 
2008; van Lente et al. 2013), so as to attract resources and good will.  
 
There is also the opposite but analogous need and desire to think through 
possible negative outcomes. And such efforts need to attract attention 
and resources too. Again, linear predictions (Williams 2008) are useful, 
albeit about doom rather than salvation. This interplay between 
technology promoters and their detractors contributes to a process of 
social learning about specific technologies (Rayner 2004) and about the 
role of technology in society more widely. Whilst the linear 
conceptualisations of technology development thus have their uses, we 
should be wary of the way they shape our understanding of what might 
be the result of current research and development efforts, and our 
evaluation of those efforts and the actors involved with them. 
 
Non-Linear Models of Technology Innovation 	  
There is a wide variety of models for the analysis of technology innovation 
available in the STS and technology and innovation studies literatures. 
This section of the paper will set out one perspective, without claiming to 
represent the full variety, but in a way that will produce a useful contrast 
with the linear model, with the aim of opening up the discussion rather 
than to pronounce on any one right way of doing so. 





A dominant theme in social science theorising on technology over the last 
three decades is that of interaction in networks. Models have tended to 
emphasise distributed agency across sets of actors and artefacts (see, 
e.g. Pinch and Bijker 1984; Latour 2005), in a process that can be more 
or less coordinated but rarely completely determined by any one agent, 
and at least in part emerges through contingent interactions. This 
perspective highlights the limits to prediction and central management, 
and so presents a messier object of analysis and governance than does 
the linear model. 
 
A second key result has been recognition of the heterogeneity of 
technology, i.e. the view that technology not only consists of a particular 
kind of object, or one particular kind of knowledge, but a heterogeneous 
range of elements, including also actors and institutions (Hughes 1983). 
Metaphors such as system building (Hughes 1983) or bricolage (Garud 
and Karnoe 2003) are used to refer to the process in which such elements 
are aligned and mutually adjusted (co-produced) in attempts at making a 
technology work and potentially stabilised for reliable performance. This 
challenges, in particular, models where science is the sole root of any 
technology, and emphasises instead their multiple origins. A 
heterogeneous model, in contrast with a linear one, would emphasise 
scientific knowledge as one kind of knowledge among several, amongst 
yet other kinds of building blocks. 
 
In this view, actors are to be seen as part of the technology, and as part 
of the heterogeneous networks that make up socio-technical 
arrangements that work. Beyond this, we may also talk of the socio-
technical contexts in which technologies are developed, and how they are 
shaped by those contexts and so implicated in wider political struggles 
(Winner 1980). The stability of any network is therefore in part dependent 
on how it fits with its contexts (cf. Geels 2005), with their structures and 




power relations (Hård 1993).5 In contrast, the linear model tends towards 
being self-contained, with internal dynamics determining outcomes. 
 
Geoengineering Governance without the Linear Model 	  
Rejecting the linear model and replacing it with a non-linear alternative, 
however, does not by itself resolve the Collingridge dilemma. Current 
activities invoking technology futures may well contribute to socially, 
ethically, and politically undesirable outcomes, and we might want to pre-
empt them by intervening in the technology innovation process. As such, 
we are not arguing that the Collingridge dilemma will be mysteriously 
dissolved once geoengineering governance frameworks adopt a non-linear 
model of technology innovation, or that we cannot – or should not – care 
about future outcomes of geoengineering at the present. We do, however, 
insist that the Collingridge dilemma and the responses to it have to be 
reconsidered when the other lesson from STS, i.e. the problems of the 
linear model, is being taken seriously. In the following, we outline several 
implications of the rejection of the linear model for the discussions on 
geoengineering governance. 
 
Firstly, it is important not to assume any naturally occurring stage, levels 
of development, or streams of development in geoengineering, at least 
not without being aware of the theoretical choices being made and of the 
problems that go with it. In other words, it is necessary for researchers 
and policy makers to be reflective about ‘linearity’ in the language of and 
framings in geoengineering governance, and they should also be wary of 
arguments and debates that fall unreflectively into the frames of the 
linear model. For instance, such arguments and debates have already 
appeared in the form of slippery slope arguments stating that 
geoengineering research will lead to its deployment because of cultural 
beliefs and vested interests permeated in geoengineering research 
(Jamieson 1996, 333; Long and Scott 2013), or because of the 
‘institutional momentum’ created by geoengineering research (Gardiner 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Although	  models	  and	  theories	  diverge	  strongly.	  For	  some	  there	  can	  be	  no	  a	  priori	  and	  sustained	  analytical	  distinctions	  between	  levels,	  and	  so	  not	  between	  technology	  and	  its	  context.	  For	  others,	  the	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  avoid	  a	  priori	  distinctions	  between	  humans	  and	  artefacts.	  The	  position	  set	  out	  here,	  allows	  for	  structurally	  determined	  levels	  and	  focuses	  on	  human	  agency.	  




2010, 289). By rejecting the linear model, we can reject the crudely 
determinist arguments suggesting inevitable movement along a path, 
trajectory, etc. in research and deployment of geoengineering. Technical 
change is not necessarily predictable and unmanageable. It is not often 
the case that technology is completely out of control after an initial 
tentative formulation even if it is not necessarily easy to control it. Again, 
this is not to assert that concerns about the slippery slope arguments and 
other related problems are unreal, but only to state that it is important 
not to conceptualise and formulate them with the language and frames of 
the linear model, which would easily lead to determinist arguments. 
Similarly, by rejecting the linear model, we should also abandon the 
assumption that there is one stable, homogenous object being 
researched, developed, deployed, etc. across different stages. In this 
respect, we can too reject essentialist arguments suggesting the future of 
geoengineering is entirely inherent in the technology itself (see, e.g. 
Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013). 
 
Secondly, if there are no stages, there is no obvious sense in which 
intervention in geoengineering can or should be ‘early’, and the 
assessment of and intervention in geoengineering need to be 
reconceptualised as an on-going process, ‘now’ is always a good time to 
act. In other words, a shift is required from the emphasis on ‘early stages’ 
or ‘upstream’ in geoengineering to the on-going process in which 
geoengineering is being researched, developed, and deployed (see Joly 
and Kaufmann 2008). In effect, it is important to be reminded that 
technologies continue to evolve in and with society when they are made 
available to the public or being put into use (Leonard-Barton 1988; Rip 
and Kemp 1998), and thus the ‘later stages’ and ‘downstream’ will be as 
important as the ‘early stages’ and ‘upstream’ in a comprehensive 
geoengineering governance framework. There are various analytic 
approaches available that aim to account for the processual dimension of 
technology innovation, and are not restrict to ‘early stages’ or ‘upstream’, 
e.g. real-time technology assessment (Guston & Sarewitz 2002), the 
technology-as-social-experiment approach (van de Poel 2009, 2011, 
2013), the technology accompaniment approach (Verbeek 2006, 2010, 
2011, 2013). Using one of these approaches should enable 




geoengineering governance to take seriously the non-linear characteristic 
of geoengineering. 
 
Thirdly, one ought to be reminded that science (and technology) is only 
one site of intervention, and there are other sites as well.  If the activities 
of the linear model are not sequential stages, they can instead be seen as 
parallel activities, and thus there are multiple sites of possible 
intervention. Intervention can target not just research, but also 
experimentation, deployment, use, ventures, regulation, policy-making, 
and the discourse of geoengineering. In short, the context in which 
geoengineering emerges is as an important site of intervention as much 
as the science and technology of geoengineering (see, e.g. Gardiner 
2010, 2011, 2014). Here, it is instructive to refer to research in the area 
of nanotechnology governance with the approach of midstream 
modulation (Fisher et al. 2006; Schuurbiers and Fisher 2009; Schuurbiers 
2011). The midstream modulation approach views the laboratory itself as 
an important site of intervention, as it is where scientists and engineers 
shape nanotechnology and bring it into being, and it is also where social, 
ethical, and political values already being imparted into technology 
through their decisions. For the proponents of midstream modulation, 
then the labs and relating settings where research takes place should too 
be opened up as sites of intervention. Insofar that upstream engagement 
on geoengineering has tended to rely on dedicated institutional set-ups 
that are separate from the labs, it will be insufficient to account for the 
multicity of the innovation processes. 
 
Fourthly, whilst the linear model tends to separate science from issues of 
ethics and politics and support understanding of it as apolitical, we argue 
that assessment and intervention need to take into account of the values 
that are at stake in innovation. Intervention should not just focus on 
scientific and technical details, but also on the values that are inevitably 
present. In short, the assessment and intervention ought to be socio-




technical, i.e. they have to take into account the values situated in the 
broader context of which geoengineering emerges.6 
 
 
Accompanying Geoengineering 	  
We have already noted that the model of technology innovation assumed 
in the discussions will affect the approach to technology governance 
envisioned, and our brief review of the literature on geoengineering 
governance has shown that the current discourse tends to emphasise the 
importance of ‘early stage’ or ‘upstream’ intervention, ‘governance before 
deployment’, etc., which could be seen as supported by the linear 
assumption that the assessment of and intervention in geoengineering at 
the early stages could predict its outcome and alter its course, and thus 
avoid or alleviate the socially, ethically, and politically inacceptable 
outcomes of geoengineering at the later stages; or, at least, the early 
assessment of and intervention in geoengineering is considered to be an 
important exercise to reveal possible social, ethical, and political problems 
in geoengineering futures, and thereby opening up the discussions on 
those issues, and raising our preparedness for them.  
 
Technology innovation, however, is non-linear; and, technology 
governance frameworks based on the linear model are at best insufficient 
and at worst misleading. Philosophers of technology have argued that the 
intended outcomes of technology in the research context might not 
always realise in the use context (Albrechtslund 2007; Ihde 2008; cf. 
Kiran 2012). This is, in part, due to outcomes of technology are not only 
determined by scientists and engineers in the research context, but also 
by users in the use context.7 For geoengineering governance, this 
argument implies that the significance of early assessment and 
intervention could be limited: without experience of the use context, the 
(normative) conclusions from the early assessment of geoengineering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Accordingly,	  our	  visions	  of	  a	  geoengineering	  world,	  which	  (re)present	  our	  values	  of	  and	  about	  geoengineering,	  are	  perhaps	  more	  appropriate	  as	  the	  object	  of	  critical	  reflection.	  See	  Ferrai	  (2013)	  for	  a	  similar	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  technological	  visions	  in	  the	  assessment	  and	  governance	  of	  nanotechnology.	  7	  Ihde	  (2008)	  calls	  this	  “the	  designer	  fallacy”,	  and	  the	  challenge	  is	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap(s)	  between	  the	  research	  (and	  design)	  context	  and	  the	  use	  context,	  see	  e.g.	  Kiran	  (2012),	  Wong	  (2013).	  




could be unrealisable in the use context; and, the intervention in the 
“early stages” or “upstream” also could not guarantee the expected 
results in the use context. This is so because users of geoengineering – 
and, the society as a whole – can diverge from the intended uses or 
respond to the expected consequences of geoengineering differently, and 
thereby render early assessment of and intervention irrelevant. In effect, 
without emphasising the heterogeneity of geoengineering, the focus on 
the “early stages” and “upstream” could (inadvertently) impose an 
essentialist view of geoengineering, and mistakenly take the object of 
analysis and evaluation to be the same throughout the innovation 
process. As technology innovation is a heterogeneous, unfolding and 
multi-sited process where human agency matters alongside material 
agency, and the overall assemblage is only predictable to a degree, 
experimenting and learning will be integral to understand what we are 
doing and what can be achieved. 
To be sure, this is not a decisive argument for abandoning assessment 
and intervention in this manner altogether, but the argument clearly 
signpost the need to go beyond the “early stages” and “upstream” in a 
geoengineering governance framework.8 Indeed, we view this as one of 
the major challenge to approach geoengineering governance without the 
linear model of technology innovation. In the following, we shall explore 
one approach in ethics of technology offered by Peter-Paul Verbeek 
(2006, 2010, 2011, 2013), and discuss how it can inform geoengineering 
governance frameworks that forgo the linear model of technology 
innovation. 
 
Verbeek (2010; also, see 2011) observes that ethics of technology has 
predominantly been viewed as a safeguard of humanity against the 
transgression of technology, and so the aim of ethics of technology is to 
analyse and evaluate technologies and their impacts on individuals, and 
to reject them if they oppose our social, ethical, and political values. 
Against this background, Verbeek proposes an alternative approach to 
ethics of technology he calls ‘technology accompaniment’. Drawing from 
actor-network theory (see, e.g. Latour 1992, 2005; Law 2009; Sayes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Our	  argument,	  therefore,	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  argument	  against	  ‘opening	  up’	  the	  geoengineering	  debate	  (see,	  e.g.	  Stirling	  2008;	  Bellamy	  et	  al.	  2013).	  In	  effect,	  ‘opening	  up’	  the	  debate	  on	  geoengineering	  can	  be	  valuable	  if	  it	  is	  not	  based	  on	  a	  linear	  model	  of	  technology	  innovation.	  




2014) and postphenomenology (see, e.g. Ihde 1993, 2009; Verbeek 
2005), Verbeek argues that human experience is always mediated by 
technology, and thus there is no external (or, non-technological) 
standpoint from which technology can be evaluated. Moreover, he argues 
that technology is not only value-laden, but it is co-constitutive of our 
morality. Accordingly, Verbeek argues that ethics of technology should 
not be evaluating whether some technologies are socially, ethically, or 
political permissible with a particular normative standard isolated from 
technology, as it will overlook the role of technology in shaping and 
transforming the moral concepts individuals use in evaluating 
technologies (also, see Swierstra et al. 2009; Boenink et al. 2010; 
Swierstra 2013); instead, ethics of technology should be devoted to 
examine various forms of human-technology-world (and, human-
technology) relations and their quality. More specifically, the technology 
accompaniment approach examines how technology can interact with our 
moral concepts and how it can transform human experience, and explores 
different ways to shape technologies and our involvement with them. As 
such, it open up the conceptual space for the inclusion of the 
contingencies in and from the use context, as human (and the broader 
context) is an integral part of the human-technology-world relations. 
 
Central to the technology accompaniment approach, therefore, is a shift 
from the evaluation of technology with an external standpoint to 
accompanying technology innovation with an internal standpoint; and, 
from the normative reflection on technology to the normative reflection 
on the quality of human-technology-world (and human-technology) 
relations. In doing so, it also requires us to reconceptualise ethics of 
technology as a task that requires continuous efforts from individuals to 
build, reflect, and maintain the technologically-mediated relations. For 
Verbeek, the aim of ethics of technology is no longer to pronounce social, 
ethical, and political (un)acceptability of technology, but to examine the 
much broader question of “what is a good way of living with technology?” 
(Verbeek 2011, 158). 
 
The technology accompaniment approach thus entails a de-centring of the 
analysis from the technology to our technologically-mediated relations 




with the world. However, this leaves a problem of delimitation: in the 
case of geoengineering, it would after all not only be geoengineering 
technologies that mediated our relation(s) with the world. By taking a 
further step towards de-centring the technology, we suggest that useful 
questions also include: what will adding geoengineering to existing sets of 
technologies – for example, energy, agricultural, or military, etc. – mean 
for our technologically-mediated relation(s) with the world? If we do so, 
we could more competently answer the questions: whether, why, and 
how we should continue with developing geoengineering technologies. 
 
Applying the technology accompaniment approach to geoengineering 
technologies shifts the emphasis of geoengineering governance away 
from the questions about whether geoengineering is socially, ethically, 
and politically acceptable to the questions about if and how 
geoengineering might contribute to the good life. In other words, instead 
of (only) probing social, ethical and political issues in geoengineering 
futures and searching for solutions to them, this approach explores 
different technologically-mediated relations presented by geoengineering 
technologies, and examines the quality of those technologically-mediated 
relations as well as geoengineering technologies’ contribution (or 
subtraction) to the existing sets of technologies we already have. This 
shift is important, as it requires us not only to question geoengineering 
technology, but also the background condition of which geoengineering 
comes into prominence and the kind of life we should live with (or 
without) geoengineering (cf. Gardiner 2011). In this way, the technology 
accompaniment approach also move away from focusing on ‘early stages’ 
and ‘upstream’ to a much broader context of inquiry. 
 
It is not our intention to spell out the technology accompaniment 
approach to geoengineering governance in full detail here. However, a 
recent analysis of solar radiation management by Maialen Galarraga and 
Bronislaw Szerszynski (2012) offers an illustrative example of how it 
could be applied.9 In their analysis, Galarraga and Szerszynski examine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Galarraga	  and	  Szerszynski	  have	  not	  referred	  to	  the	  technological	  accompaniment	  approach	  in	  their	  analysis,	  but	  their	  emphasis	  on	  various	  forms	  of	  human-­‐world	  relation	  presented	  by	  implementation	  of	  solar	  radiation	  management	  provides	  an	  interesting	  example	  of	  how	  the	  technologically-­‐mediated	  relations	  of	  geoengineering	  technologies	  can	  be	  analysed.	  




different ways in which implementation of solar radiation management 
can be conceptualised. They distinguish three different accounts of 
‘making climates’, i.e. producing, educing, and creating; and, introduce 
three types of climate makers corresponding to each account of ‘making’: 
climate architect, climate artisan, and climate artist. What is novel and 
interesting about their analysis is their attempt to understand different 
technologically-mediated relations in the implementation and the human-
world relations associated with them.  
 
More specifically, Galarraga and Szerszynski show that the 
implementation can be understood via the notion of production, i.e. “the 
imposition of an existing form onto formless matter” (2012, 225), and the 
ideal-type of human-world relation corresponds to this notion is the 
climate architect, i.e. an agent who attempts to impose a new form onto 
the matter of climate. Alternatively, they note that the implementation 
can be understood via the notion of educing in which “form is drawn out 
from the potentialities of matter itself” (2012, 226); and, corresponding 
to this notion is the climate artisan who focuses on the process in which 
the en-forming of climate occurs, and facilitates the form’s coming into 
being. Finally, the notion of creation, which is about “the capacity a create 
a new eidos [i.e. essence, ideal] that is not wholly determined by 
anything that pre-exists it” (2012, 227), is associated with the climate 
artist who views climate-making to be inevitably involved in creating 
climatically novel states. 
 
Galarraga and Szerszynski have offered an illustrative example of how to 
analyse the human-technology-world (and human-technology) relations 
presented by geoengineering: geoengineering allows human beings to 
produce, educe or create climate, and it engenders different types of role 
(or relation) we have to the world, i.e. architect, artisan and artist.10 For 
the technology accompaniment approach, the normative question will be 
the desirability of the human-technology-world relations made possible by 
geoengineering, and the role (or, relation) human beings ought to have to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Their	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  solar	  radiation	  management	  technologies	  but	  not	  carbon	  dioxide	  reduction	  technologies.	  It	  is,	  however,	  plausible	  that	  the	  human-­‐technology-­‐world	  relations	  and	  the	  ideal-­‐types	  Galarraga	  and	  Szerszynksi	  suggest	  have	  identified	  are	  also	  applicable	  to	  carbon	  dioxide	  reduction	  technologies.	  




the world. In the case of Galarraga and Szerszynski, they believe that 
neither ‘production’ nor ‘educing’ is suitable to characterise the human-
technology-world relation in geoengineering; it is the ‘creation’ 
relationship, and thus the role of climate artist, they think can enable us 
to deal with the novelty of the geoengineered climate system. Whether 
Galarraga and Szerszynski is correct or not requires further discussion, 
but if they are correct about the desirability of the ‘creation’ relationship, 
the technology accompaniment approach will assert that geoengineering 
ought to be developed (and implemented) with this account of making. At 
the same time, it will also recommend people to become climate artists 
too. It should be clarified that the technology accompaniment approach 
does not imply we have to accept any one way of doing geoengineering. 
We may find all forms of geoengineering unpalatable. Yet, it does remind 
us of the possibility to (re)configure the human-technology-world 
relations of geoengineering, instead of rejecting geoengineering outright. 
 
In short, accompanying geoengineering means that we should redirect 
our attention from the science and technology of geoengineering to the 
quality of human-technology-world (and human-technology) relations of 
geoengineering. And, geoengineering governance needs to understand 
how geoengineering can (re)shape our morality and transform human 
experience, and concerns with shaping both geoengineering technologies 
and individuals’ involvement with them. Ultimately, the questions for 
geoengineering governance should be about geoengineering’s contribution 
to the good life, the good society, and the good climate. Of course, we 
have not touched on the more fundamental questions concerning what is 
the good life, the good society, or the good climate, and thus the 
questions about what is considered to be a good technologically-mediated 
relation of geoengineering remains to be answered. Yet, we believe the 
technology accompaniment approach provides us the impetus to re-open 
the dialogue on the normative questions not only about geoengineering, 
but about the good life, the good society, and the good climate in general. 
	    






In this paper, we have argued that the discourse on geoengineering and 
its governance is problematically characterised by a strong but implicit 
reliance on the linear model of technology innovation. We have also 
sought to point out alternative, non-linear ways in which we can 
conceptualise geoengineering innovation, and pointed to some 
consequences of such a re-conceptualisation for geoengineering 
assessment and governance.  
 
We have thus contributed a new perspective to the discussion of 
geoengineering innovation, assessment and governance.  Moreover, we 
have outlined some governance implications, including the need to see 
intervention as an on-going activity, the need to intervene in sites beyond 
science labs and dedicated engagement forums, the necessity to evaluate 
and debate social and ethical commitments alongside and together with 
scientific and technical facts, and the need to de-centre geoengineering 
technology in assessments and instead re-focus on what geoengineering 
– among other technologies – does to our relations with the world. 
Further work could usefully specify and test practical forms for these 
abstract implications.  
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